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LIBEL AND SLANDER - CLASSIFICATION OF RADIO DEFAMATION LIABILITY oF BROADCASTER - The advent of radio has added an
interesting problem to the field of defamation. The chief aspects of this
problem are twofold: First, should the broadcast of defamatory matter
over the air be treated as libel or slander? Second, which of the several
parties to a defamatory broadcast should be held responsible?
I.

Distinguishing between libel and slander has always proved troublesome. In this, as in many other fields of law, the difficulty arises because
the necessity for the distinction had its origin not in logic but in historical accident. The action for defamatory utterances was developed
as an action in case and was well established by the end of the sixteenth century. Libel had its beginning as a criminal matter, arising
when the Star Chamber assumed jurisdiction over printing. When the
common-law courts took over the Star Chamber jurisdiction and turned
libel into a civil cause of action, not all the criminal characteristics of
the action were forgotten.1 It thus developed that all libels were actionable without proof of special damage, while only certain types of
slander were so actionable; 2 and hence came the necessity for distinguishing between the two forms of defamation.
In rationalizing this distinction the courts have said that libel deserves the more severe treatment because written defamation shows
more deliberate malice and leads to greater damage since it is permanent and subject to wider diffusion. These arguments were criticized
1
2

2 ToRTS RESTATEMENT, historical note to § 568 (1938).
HARPER, ToRTS, § 238 (1933).
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by Lord Mansfield in the case of Thorley v. Lord Kerry,8 but, having
pointed out the lack of logic in the distinction, Lord Mansfield bowed
to precedent. So courts have persisted in according different treatment,
depending on whether the defamation is written or spoken, regardless
of the malice or damage involved. It is only in the borderline cases
that these factors have been called upon to aid in determining whether
the defamation is libel or slander.
The American Law Institute restates the law this way: 4

" (I) Libel consists of the publication of defamatory matter
by written or printed words, by its embodiment in physical form,
or by any other form of communication which has potentially
harmful qualities characteristic of written or printed words.
"( 2) Slander consists of the publication of defamatory matter
by spoken words, transitory gestures, or by any form of communication other than those stated in subsection (r).
"(3) The area of dissemination, the deliberate and premeditated character of its publication, and the persistence of the defamatory conduct are factors to be considered in determining
whether a publication is a libel rather than a slander."
In which of these classifications should radio defamation be placed?
Physically, it is publication of the spoken word, but its potential harm
and its wide area of dissemination cry for its treatment as libel. The
American Law Institute committee, in discussing the problem, recognized that reading from a written manuscript over the radio could be
safely called libel, but refused to commit itself on the question whether
extemporaneous radio defamation was libel or slander. 5
The Australian court takes issue with the committee even on the
question of reading from a script over the radio. In the case of Meldrum,
v. Australian Broadcasting Co.,6 where an employee of the defendant
3
4 Taunt. 355 at 365, 128 Eng. Rep. 367 (1812): "It is curious that they
[ who seek to justify the distinction] have also adverted to the question, whether it
tends to produce a breach of the peace: but that is wholly irrelevant, and is no ground
for recovering damages. So it has been argued that writing shews more deliberate
malignity; but the same answer suffices, that the action is not maintainable on the
ground of the malignity, but for the damage sustained. So, it is argued that written
scandal is more generally diffused than words spoken, and is therefore actionable; but
an assertion made in a public place, as upon the Royal Exchange, concerning a merchant
in London, may be much more extensively diffused than a few printed pages dispersed,
or a private letter: it is true that a newspaper may be very generally read, but that is all
casual."
4
2 TORTS RESTATEMENT, § 568 (1938).
lS Id., § 568, comment f.
6
[1932] Viet. L. Rep. 425.
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had read from a script certain matters defamatory to the plaintiff, the
court said,
"in relation to libel publication should mean the conveying to the
mind of some third person of the distinctive element of libel, not
merely the defamatory matter, but also the permanent form in
which it is expressed and recorded." 7
Since there was no allegation that listeners would regard what they
heard as being read from a manuscript, it was held to be the publication of a slander.
In the few cases that have arisen in this country on the subject of
radio defamation, the courts so far as possible have avoided the task of
determining whether the broadcasting of defamatory matter is libel
or -slander, but it is safe to say that, at least in the cases where the
defamation is read from a script, the ·courts are quite likely to follow
the view of the American Law Institute committee.
The problem of extemporaneous remarks was dealt with directly
by a New York nisi prius court. In Locke v. Gibbons,8 plaintiff, a newspaperman, alleged that the defendant interpolated extemporaneous
untrue remarks while broadcasting plaintiff's newsscript of the Ohio
River floods in order to make the broadcast sound more exciting, thus
injuring plaintiff's reputation as a news reporter. Since there was no
allegation of special damage, the court found it necessary to determine
whether the defamatory utterances were libel or slander. The court
held that, while reading from a script might be libel, this was slander,
for "Libel has always been considered as written, and slander as spoken,
defamation." 9 Radio broadcasting, the court said, is not different from
an address over an amplifier to a large audience.
It is evident that radio defamation fits comfortably into neither
category. The sound policy arguments of wide dissemination and consequent serious damage would justify treating it as libel,1° but they
are met with the firmly imbedded notion that since the defamation
arises from oral delivery it is slander by definition.11 To distinguish
between extemporaneous and prepared speeches is unreasonable, since
the consequences are the same in either case.12 In order to avoid the
clash between policy and definition, most writers conclude that radio
Id. at 443.
164 Misc. 877, 299 N. Y. S. 188 (1937).
9 Id., 164 Misc. at 880.
10 Vold, "The Basis for Liability for Defamation by Radio," 19 MINN. L. REv.
611 ( 193 5), suggests that the broadcast of defamatory matter is libel because it involves "conduct" rather than speech or writing on the part of the broadcaster.
11 Locke v. Gibbons, 164 Misc. 877, 299 N. Y. S. 188 (1937).
12 2 SocoLOw, THE kw oF RADIO BROADCASTING 850-851 (1939).
7

8
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defamation should be classed as neither libel nor slander, but should
be considered sui generis,18 and they do so for the obvious purpose of
permitting policy to prevail.14
2.

On the second aspect of radio defamation-liability of the particular defendant-the controlling question is whether or not he can be
said to be a publisher of the defamation. With this question in mind
there are several parties whose liability is free from doubt.
First, the speaker is clearly liable as a direct and original publisher
of the defamation.15
Second, the speaker's employer or principal is liable on an agency
theory, 16 whether the defamation is extemporaneous or not, as long as
the utterance was made in the course of the speaker's employment.
On this theory a broadcasting company is liable for defamation by its
announcers or performers on a sustaining program, and sponsors are
liable for defamation published during a sponsored broadcast where the
time is leased from the station.
Third, a broadcasting company should be held liable whenever it
knew that defamatory matter was to be broadcast, or whenever it was
negligent in allowing it to be broadcast.11 Thus where a script has been
submitted previous to the broadcast, or, perhaps, even where a script
could have been required but was not, the station should not escape
liability. This proposition is sustained by applying the rule that one
who disseminates defamatory matter originally published by a third
person is liable unless he has no reason to know of its defamatory
character.18
The big controversy in the field of radio defamation centers around
the question whether negligent conduct should constitute the limit of
a broadcaster's liability. Numerous analogies have been urged to support or defeat the proposition that a radio station should be held absolutely liable for all defamations broadcast through its facilities regardless of whether the publication could be prevented by the exercise of
due care.19
Id. 847 et seq. See also 12 ORE. L. REV. 149 (1933).
Several states have determined the matter by statute. Oregon and Washington
treat it as libel. 3 Ore. Comp. Laws Ann. (1940), § 23-437; Wash. Rev. Stat. (Rem.
Supp. 1940), § 2424. California, Illinois and North Dakota treat it as slander. Cal.
Pen. Code (Deering, 1937), § 258; III. Ann. Stat. (Smith-Hurd, 1935), c. 126, §
4; N. D. Laws (1929), c. u7, p. 142.
15
2 SocoLOw, THE LAw OF RADIO BROADCASTING 851 (1939).
16
Id. 856-857.
17
Id. 857, 859. See also 6 Am L. REv. 81 (1935); 38 MICH. L. REV. 415
18

H

(1939).
18
2 ToRTS RESTATEMENT, § 581, and comment f (1938).
19

For a further discussion of these analogies, see Vold, "The Basis for Liability
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First it is argued that a radio station is like a telephone company
in that both merely furnish facilities to carry the voice of another, and
since a telephone company is liable for defamation only in the event
of negligence, such should be the rule applied to a broadcasting station.20 But the answers to this are many and convincing. Telephone
transmission is an automatic process, while radio technicians must constantly and actively participate to make the sounds intelligible to the
listener. Telephone companies are common carriers, under a legal duty
to transmit, but radio stations select and control their own programs.
Finally, telephone messages usually go to but one listener, "in a sealed
envelope, as it were" 21 and are therefore relatively harmless; radio
statements reach millions and thereby become a far more dangerous
form of defamation.
Next it is urged that a radio station is like a telegraph company,
which, though it actively participates in the transmission of a libel, is
held accountable only if it fails to exercise due care. 22 But most of the
arguments against the telephone analogy are applicable here also. The
possibility of damage is slight, for telegraph companies transmit private
and confidential correspondence, while the aim of the radio station is
to reach as many listeners as possible. Furthermore, as pointed out by
the American Law Institute,23 telegraph companies are relieved from
the strict liability theory usually imposed in defamation cases, because
such companies have a duty as public utilities to accept for transmission
all messages composed in apparently innocent language. The immunity,
says the Institute, is analogous to that of one who takes possession of
a dangerous animal or carries on an ultrahazardous activity under a
duty imposed upon him as a public officer or employee or as a common
carrier. This is a form of privilege, but not the privilege granted, as in
the case of a judicial proceeding, because of a public interest in encouraging freedom of expression. Rather it is. an immunity granted in
the interest of fairness because the telegraph company is under a legal
duty to do the thing that might cause harm. That element of fairness is
not present in the case of a radio station. True, a station is under an
for Defamation by Radio," 19 MINN. L. REv. 611 (1935); 2 SocoLOw, THE LAW
OF RADIO BROADCASTING 854-856 (1939).
20 Though there appear to be no cases on the subject of liability of a telephone
company for defamation over its wires, it is assumed that negligence would be the only
basis of liability. Summit Hotel Co. v. National Broadcasting Co., 336 Pa, 182, 8 A.
(2d) 302 (1939).
21 Otis, J., in Coffey v. Midland Broadcasting Co., (D. C. Mo. 1934) 8 F. Supp.
889 at 890 (1934).
22 In regard to the liability of a telegraph company for transmitting defamatory
messages, see Peterson v. Western Union Tel. Co., 72 Minn. 41, 74 N. W. 1022
(1898); 29 MICH. L. REv. 339 (1931); 2 ToRTS RESTATEMENT,§ 612 (1938).
28 2 ToRTS RESTATEMENT,§ 612, comment b (1938).
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obligation to present programs of public interest, but this is a duty of
selection, the opposite of the telegraph company's obligation to accept
for transmission every message presented. In this sense, therefore, a
strict liability rule would foster rather than discourage performance of
the radio station's duty to present programs only in the public interest.
Finally, the damage sustained by the plaintiff in a telegraph case is too
slight to overcome the argument of fairness, while in the radio case
the injury may be so extensive that it would be far more inequitable
to let the innocent plaintiff suffer the damage than to hold liable the
broadcasting company which caused the injury, however faultlessly.
The third analogy proposed in defense of the radio station is the
case where a public address system in a public hall is rented and becomes
a device used in the publication of a defamatory statement. But in such
a case the owner parts with his possession and control over the device,
while even where radio time is leased, the station owner remains in
possession and actively aids in the broadcast.
The final analogy proposed in support of the limited liability of
broadcasters is that of a news dealer. 24 In the case of extemporaneous
radio defamation, the station, like a newsvendor, ' has no way of
knowing of the defamatory matter, or of preventing its publication.
Consequently, it is urged, the station is a mere disseminator of defamatory matter uttered by others and should be liable only when it knew,
or in the exercise of due care should have known, of the defamatory
words. But advocates of absolute liability hasten to point out that a
broadcast is the first and only active publication and the station is an
original and principal publisher; while a newsvendor takes only a
subordinate part in the dissemination of the libel and becomes a party
only after the libel has been published.
Proponents of the absolute liability rule for radio broadcasting suggest the similarity to a newspaper. 25 The radio station and the newspaper have the same privilege of editorial selection, both furnish the
active means by which statements of which they are often not the author
are transmitted to the public, and both, by using due care, can exercise
a measure of effective control, but neither as a practical matter can
prevent occasional lapses. The similarity of the two is further demonstrated by the fact that they are competing advertising mediums, and
in both cases the potential harm is so great that there is need for pro24
For the liability of a newsvendor, see Emmens v. Pottle, 16 Q. B. D. 354
(1885); Street v. Johnson, 80 Wis. 455, 50 N. W. 395 (1891); 2 TORTS RESTATEMENT,§ 581, comment c (1938).
25 That the liability of a newspaper for libel is absolute is held in Morrison v.
Ritchie & Co., 39 Scot. L. Rep. 432 (1902); Washington Post Co. v. Kennedy, 55
App. D. C. 162, 3 F. (2d) 207 (1924); Sweet v. Post Publishing Co., 215 Mass.
450, 102 N. E. 660 (1913). Contra, where the defamatory matter came from news
services, Layne v. Tribune Co., 108 Fla. 177, 146 So. 234 (1933).
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tection of innocent victims. Even those who hold to this analogy cannot but admit, however, that due care is more effective in the press
than in radio because of the possibility of ad libbing and because a
script may not be available if the broadcast does not originate in the
station's studios.
These analogies have been discussed by nearly every court in which
cases involving radio defamation have arisen. The first case which arose
in this country was that of Sorenson v. Wood, 26 decided in Nebraska
in 1932. In that case a political speaker had defamed an opposing
candidate. Despite the fact that the radio station had failed to check
a script which had been submitted prior to the broadcast, the jury found
for the defendant under the trial court's instruction that if the station
owner honestly and in good faith exercised due care, he was not liable.
The appellate court held the instruction to be in error, and, adopting
the newspaper analogy, said that the principles of absolute liability
should apply. In Miles v. Louis Wasmer, Inc., 21 which arose in the
state of Washington the following year, there was much the same situation in that the station had in advance a copy of the script. The Washington court also approved the newspaper analogy and adopted the rule
of absolute liability, though it could have based its decision on negligence.
In r934 a federal court was confronted with the case of Coffey v.
Midland Broadcasting Co. 28 On a Columbia n~twork program originating in New York an employee of the sponsor had remarked that
plaintiff was an ex-convict. The program was broadcast by defendant,
a Kansas City station, which had no advance notice of the defamatory
words, and of course no means of interrupting them once they were
uttered. The court, speaking through Judge Otis, said,
"I assume a sudden utterance . . . of defamatory words not included in the manuscript, an utterance so quickly made as to
render impossible its prevention; I assume, in short, a complete
absence of the slightest negligence on the part of the owner of the
station. . .. The conclusion seems inescapable that the owner of
the station is liable. It is he who broadcasted the defamation." 2 g
The telephone analogy was mentioned, but cast aside, and again the
newspaper analogy was approved.
In the Oregon case of Irwin v. Ashurst,8° where the defamation
had been uttered by an attorney during the broadcast of a murder trial,
123 Neb. 348, 243 N. W. 82 (1932).
172 Wash. 466, 20 P. (2d) 847 (1933).
28 (D. C. Mo. 1934) 8 F. Supp. 889.
29 Id. at 890.
ao 158 Ore. 61, 74 P. (2d) u27 (1938).
26
27
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the court cited with approval the cases which had adopted the absolute
liability rule, but carrying out the newspaper analogy, held that the
radio station was privileged to give a fair and accurate report of the
judicial proceedings, and on that ground was not liable.
Up to this point the newspaper analogy and the rule of absolute
liability seemed to receive general judicial approval. But in I939
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court gave it a serious setback in the case
of Summit Hotel Co. v. National Broadcasting Co. 81 In that case after
several rehearsals of a nondefamatory script, the program's master of
ceremonies during the broadcast suddenly ad libbed of the plaintiff,
"That's a rotten hotel." The court, after discussing the other analogies,
said,
"Newspaper matter is prepared in advance, reviewed by members of the various staffs, set into type, printed, proof read and
then 'run off' by employees of the publisher; at all times opportunity is afforded the owner to prevent the publication of the
defamatory statement up to the time of the delivery of the paper
to the news vender. . . . But [in the radio cases] where the circumstances, like those now presented, are such that the defamation
occurs beyond the control of the broadcaster, it is perfectly clear
that the analogy between newspapers and broadcasting companies
collapses completely." 82
These five cases represent the state of the authorities today. After
viewing them the American Law Institute inserted this caveat in its
Restatement:
"The Institute expresses no opinion as to whether the proprietors of a radio broadcasting station are relieved from liability
for a defamatory broadcast by a person not in their employ if they
could not have prevented the publication by the exercise of reasonable care, or whether, as an original publisher, they are liable
irrespective of the precautions taken to prevent the defamatory
publication." 88
This caveat was added because the committee thought the law too
unsettled to warrant a definite statement on the matter.u
In the last analysis, whether the rule of absolute liability should be
applied to the radio field depends upon public policy and fairness. The
circumstances are such that to hold either way would not run afoul of
81

336 Pa. 182, 8 A. (2d) 1127 (1938).
Id., 336 Pa. at 196.
33
2 ToRTS RESTATEMENT, § 577, comment g, caveat (1938).
HSee 12 AMERICAN LAw lNsTITUTE PROCEEDINGS 360-363 (1935).
82
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any established legal concepts. In marshalling the arguments for and
against the application of the rule of absolute liability to the broadcaster, the following might well be mentioned:
A. In favor of absolute liability:
r. The rule of absolute liability is firmly intrenched in the field
of defamation-as for example the newspaper situation-and it is only
by a departure from the law of defamation that the liability of a radio
station could be governed by the due care doctrine. 35
2. The broadcaster is best able to prevent the perpetration of the
defamation, and even though failure to use due care was not a factor
in a particular case, the rule of absolute liability would !induce him to
use all possible safeguards.
3. The victims are innocent and passive, and since the harm is so
great, it is only fair to place the burden on the one who by his voluntary activity makes the harm possible.
4. The broadcaster is in the business for profit, hence it is reasonable that he should bear the burden of the damage that results.
5. The broadcaster is best able to protect himself by indemnity or
insurance. As a matter of fact most broadcasters now require an indemnity on sponsored broadcasts. Insurance is as available to radio
stations as it is to newspapers.
Although not speaking directly of the radio problem, Professor
Harper in his classic treatise on Torts had this to say,
"A plaintiff's reputation may be harmed quite as much by a libel
innocently published as by any other kind, and such a risk, it
would seem, is properly allocated to him whose business, operated
for his own immediate profit, creates it. It is submitted that losses
of this nature may very well be regarded by the law as one of the
expenses of the undertaking which caused it." 86
B. Against absolute liability:
r. The rule of absolute liability is a throwback to the middle
ages. In modern society people should assume the risk of living and
tort liability should be imposed only in cases of negligence.
2. The 'impossibility of complete program control makes it unfair
to hold liable the station owner.
3. The radio is a new industry which should be encouraged and
not subjected to liability for events over which it has no control.
4. Public discussion would be restricted and discouraged by the
application of the absolute liability doctrine.
William F. Hood
35

Vold, "The Basis for Liability for Defamation by Radio," 19

6II at 626 et seq. (1935).
86 HARPER, TORTS 505 (1933).
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